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Abstract 
This paper reports results from a recent survey we conducted on the union status of over 650 
firms in the private sector of the UK. Compared to earlier periods, the survey shows that since 1997 there has 
been a slight fall in derecognition, but a relatively large increase in union recognition. Almost 11% of firms 
report experiencing some new recognition, whilst 7% reported some derecognition. In the late 1980s new 
recognitions among similar firms were much lower (3% between 1985 to 1990 according to Gregg and Yates, 
1991). In our survey, new recognitions were more prevalent in larger firms and in regions and industries where 
union membership was already high. New recognitions were less likely to have occurred in companies with 
higher wages, higher productivity and higher capital intensity. The ‘blip up’ in new recognitions is consistent 
with the idea that the incoming Labour government had a positive effect on the ability of unions to gain 
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1. Introduction 
 
Union decline in Britain has been very marked, with there being almost continuous year-on-year 
falls in union presence, however measured, since the late 1970s and certainly up to the late 1990s.  
A sizable body of research has studied these falls, concluding that the dynamics of entry of new 
workplaces and firms is crucial to explaining union decline. The received wisdom is that 
unionization rates have fallen rapidly as unions have failed to achieve union recognition status in 
newly set up places of work (Machin, 2000).  At the same time, new recognition or derecognition 
in existing workplaces and differential closure of union workplaces, are, at least in the periods 
studied, seen to be much less important. 
In this paper we try to shed some additional light on these questions, looking at new 
evidence on changes in union status in recent years.  The period since 1997 is interesting for at 
least two reasons. First, the secular decline in union membership seems to have levelled off (see 
Figure 1). Secondly, this aggregate levelling off coincided with the election of the Labour 
government in 1997 - just as the start of the long decline in unionisation coincided with the defeat 
of the last Labour administration in 1979.  
Our new evidence comes from a survey of a large number of firms, operating across all 
sectors of the UK private economy, which was undertaken in 2002.  The results that emerge are 
highly suggestive of a break from the patterns of the previous twenty years or so.  Indeed, our 
survey isolates much more new recognition going on in the five years between 1997 and 2002 
than was found in a similarly constructed survey of firms relating to the period between 1985 and 
1990. By contrast, the proportion of firms experiencing derecognition is similar across these two 
time periods. 
The period we consider in this paper marks a possible shift in the recent history of 
industrial relations in the UK. Throughout the 1980s a range of anti-union legislative measures 
were introduced by Conservative Governments and these seemed to have a particularly adverse 
effect on recognition in establishments set up after 1979 (Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1995). 
The 1997 election of the New Labour Government marked a break from the anti-union 
Conservative period.  In particular, in 1999 the Government legislated to introduce the 
Employment Relations Act which made provision for a statutory recognition procedure.  
The 1999 Employment Relations Act (ERA) mandates recognition in cases where a 
majority of workers want it, allowing for ballots to determine the strength of union support.  
However, the real goal of the legislation was to encourage the voluntary settlement of recognition 
disputes between employers and unions, and parties were encouraged to withdraw from the   2
formal procedure and achieve a voluntary agreement at several stages. As Wood, Moore and 
Ewing (2003) point out the true importance of the legislation is that it “transforms any 
negotiations about recognition they [unions] may have with employers, since both sides know 
that the union can resort to the legal machinery” (page 119). 
Gall (2004) uses a variety of data sources to consider how the legal and other 
environmental changes from the late 1990s onwards have influenced trade union recognition 
between 1995 and 2002. The author finds a small growth in the number of recognition 
agreements between 1994 and 1998 and then a very marked growth from 1999 onwards.  Gall’s 
data is somewhat limited since it relies in part on the Trade Union Trends surveys which do not 
cover all unions; these are supplemented by trade union records which are often incomplete.  It is 
therefore extremely useful to try to validate Gall’s findings using data from a representative 
survey of firms.  
In both our survey and the work by Gall (2004) it is difficult to pin-point precisely the 
impact of legislative factors from other changes. Gall (2004) points to evidence of a number of 
changes in the general industrial relations environment over the period of interest. Dibb, Lupton 
and Alsop (2002) indicate a fall in the extent to which employers regard unions as ‘damaging’ to 
industrial relations.  This is likely to be related to an acceptance of the ‘business case’ for 
unionism where employee involvement is seen as beneficial (or at least, not harmful) to the 
overall performance of the enterprise. In addition, the public standing of unions has increased; 
unions are consulted more often than at any time in recent years and both the public and 
employers appear to be more sympathetic to the new style of ‘partnership’ unionism.  
Although it is not possible to pinpoint the impact of the legal change precisely, it is clear 
that the new legislation has gone hand-in-hand with an increased commitment to securing 
recognition by unions.  In a survey of unions conducted by Wood, Moore and Ewing (2002), and 
also discussed in Moore, Wood and Willman (2003), two-thirds of those with significant 
recognition stated they had increased their campaigning between 1997 and 2000. The timing of 
these campaigns indicates a link with the legislation. A parallel survey of 400 private sector 
employers reveals that of 12 percent of workplaces experienced recognition campaigns between 
1995 and 2000, and of these 17 percent were conducted in the second half of 1999 and 41 percent 
were in the first half of 2000. In addition, the findings from our survey point to an increase in 
recognition, but no parallel change in derecognition; this encourages us to believe that the 
legislation itself may have been important.    3
The paper is structured as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss the survey, detailing how we 
were able to sample firms across the whole size distribution and across the whole economy, and 
also presenting some simple descriptive statistics on the nature of the survey respondents.   
Section 3 presents the main results from the survey, drawing comparisons with earlier surveys, 
and looking at the economic characteristics of firms that did and did not change union status in 
the recent past.  Section 4 concludes and draws implications for current patterns of unionization 
in the UK economy. 
 
 
2. The Survey 
 
2.1 Sampling Frame and Survey Implementation 
 
The survey was conducted in 2002 and the sampling frame used was the FAME (Financial 
Analysis Made Easy) data source.  FAME consists of all registered UK firms (about 2.5 million 
per year). We randomly selected 3,500 firms who had more than 50 employees (on 1
st January 
2002), found the address of the Human Resources (HR) director or equivalent and mailed out 
surveys. We re-contacted non-respondents up to three times. Our questionnaire (see Annex 1) 
covered aspects of current unionism (both density and coverage) and asked about recognition 
changes since 1997.  The design of the survey means the sample, both respondents and non-
respondents, can be matched with information on the firm from the FAME data.  This provides 
details on employment, industry, region and many measures of financial performance. This data 
can be used to investigate characteristics of firms that are associated with unionism and changes 
in union recognition.  
  Our data collection technique is similar to that used by Gregg and Yates (1991).  Gregg 
and Yates used the EXSTAT database of the accounts of public companies to generate their 
sample and then issued a survey in 1990 asking about changes in recognition in the periods 1980-
1984 and 1985-1989.  Given the similarity of approach it therefore seems legitimate to compare 
our results with those obtained in this earlier paper to investigate changes over time.  Our sample 
frame covers a somewhat wider range of firms, as EXSTAT includes only stock market listed 
firms. One potential problem with the FAME database is that (unlike EXSTAT) it contains both 
consolidated and non-consolidated accounts. To avoid double counting we used subsidiary data if   4
it was available and dropped the consolidated accounting information. If we had only partial 
subsidiary information we used only the consolidated accounts.
1 
 
2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1 reports mean values of all the main variables we have extracted from FAME for 
respondents and non-respondents to the survey.
2 This enables us to check if the firms for which 
we have union data are representative of the full random sample of firms who were included in 
the initial sample. Although larger firms and those in the non-service sectors were slightly more 
likely to answer, the only statistically significant difference (at the 5% level on a two tailed 
significance test) is that firms in agriculture, mining and utilities are slightly more likely to 
answer, with these firms contributing 5% to the sample of respondents compared with 3.5% in 
the same of non-respondents. As such, the responses seem to be broadly representative of larger 
FAME firms.  The responding firms had, on average, about 3,000 employees, paid average salary 
costs of £29,000 and grew by 9% a year between 1996 and 1998.
3 Around 40% are 
manufacturing and construction firms, about half are in the rest of the service sector and the 
remainder are in agriculture, mining and the utilities. 
In terms of the level of union presence, 48% of firms had some sort of recognition in 
2002. Figures 2 and 3 show the distribution of union density and coverage across the firms in our 
sample. Over a third of firms had no union members at all (Figure 2). Of the firms with some 





                                                 
1 We also checked that all our results were robust to using only the consolidated accounts data.  
2 The initial 3,500 sampling frame included both consolidated and non-consolidated accounts. After dropping the 
firms which could result in double-counting there was a sample of 2,611 potentially usable firms and these are 
included in Table 1. 947 firms answered the questionnaire from the 3,500, a response rate of 27%. This is a better 
response rate than a typical postal survey and was partly due to our persistence in following up non-responders up to 
three times. Of the 2,611 possible non-overlapping responses there were 708 firms who answered the questionnaire 
(27%).  Even among the respondents, there were some further difficulties with missing values and some inconsistent 
responses. In order to have good information on changes in recognition status, the firms must provide valid and 
consistent answers to question 2 (“Current recognition status”) question 5 (“Any new recognition”) and question 6 
(“Any new derecognition”); these restrictions further reduce the sample to 652, as shown in Table 2.  
3 Employment growth is defined based on the number of employees recorded in the FAME data and is high in the 
table, largely due to some large outliers increasing the average. The median annual employment growth is 5.2% for 
those who replied to the survey and 5.4% for non-respondents.   5
3. Survey Results 
 
3.1 Changes in Union Recognition 
 
Table 2 examines changes in union recognition over time by comparing the new survey findings 
with those from Gregg and Yates (1991). In the new survey (column (1)) almost 11% of firms 
reported at least some new recognition since 1997.  This was mostly limited recognition in some 
of the firms’ workplaces (8.9%), but there were also some new recognition across the entire firm 
(1.8%).  This is a much larger proportion of new recognitions than in Gregg and Yates’ (1991) 
analysis of firm-level unionization in the 1980s.  They found only 3% of their sample of firms 
experienced new recognition between 1985 and 1990 and only 1.8% between 1980 and 1984. By 
contrast, the incidence of derecognition is similar in the new survey data:  8.4% of firms reported 
whole or incomplete derecognition in the late 1980s in the Gregg-Yates survey as compared to 
7.2% in the new survey.
4 
 
3.2 Comparisons with Other Sources 
 
These trends are broadly comparable with those found in Gall (2004) who also indicates a strong 
increase in new recognition, particularly from 1999 onwards.  Gall, however, finds a decline in 
the number of derecognitions, from on average 50 derecognitions a year between 1989 and 1997 
and less than 11 per year from 1998 onwards. As Gall admits his data is ‘self-selecting’, in that 
the recognitions and derecognitions he observes are not based on representative samples, the 
collection of consistent data on recognition changes is one of the motivations behind this study.  
Our findings can also be compared with the 1990-1998 Workplace Employee Relations 
Survey (WERS) panel, which along with the other WIRS/WERS surveys has been a source for 
many discussions of trade union decline (e.g. Disney, Gosling and Machin, 1994 and Machin, 
2000). However, the WERS data is based on somewhat different sampling criteria than our 
survey.  It is a sample of establishments; in contrast, the FAME data is at the firm level; it 
includes both public and private sector establishments, unlike FAME which by construction is 
focused on the private sector. The final major difference concerns the number of employees.  The 
                                                 
4 The Gregg and Yates sample of firms is similar to our own (the medians of firm size are extremely well matched at 
781 in Gregg and Yates compared to 771 in our data), so the difference in new recognitions does not appear to be 
due to differential sample composition. The economy grew faster in the late 1980s than the late 1990s so differential 
business cycle effects are unlikely to account for the difference in recognition changes.   6
FAME data we use is for firms with over 50 employees.  The earlier WIRS data (1980, 1984, and 
1990) used a sample frame of establishments with 25 or more employees, while WERS 1998 
reduced this limit to 10 employees 
Information in WERS enables us to limit the sample to private sector firms. On this basis 
it appears that just 4 percent of workplaces newly recognised unions between 1990 and 1998 
while 5 percent experienced derecognition over this period
5. At face value, this indicates that the 
recent rise in recognition we observe is a new phenomenon. However, it should be noted that due 
to the differences in the sample composition, evaluating changes across time are not as powerful 
on this basis as the comparisons are with Gregg and Yates. 
 
3.3 Firm Characteristics and Union Recognition 
 
Table 3 examines differences in firm characteristics by recognition status. Most of the variables 
are in natural logarithms so the differences can be read in percentage terms. Many of the well 
known findings in the literature on union status are reproduced in our new survey
6. Union 
recognition is significantly more likely in large firms, and amongst those with low profitability 
and low productivity (value added per head is about 15 log points lower in recognised firms). The 
Table also shows what is by now a well known negative correlation between union status and 
employment growth (e.g. Blanchflower et al, 1991, Machin and Wadhwani, 1991, and Bryson, 
2004) and also a negative association of unionisation with capital intensity.   
Perhaps the only real surprise in Table 3 is that wages are significantly lower amongst 
unionised firms.  Whilst surprising given the large literature showing there to be a positive wage 
premium linked to recognition (see Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003, for a summary of recent 
evidence on the union premium in the UK) this is likely to be due to the fact that union status is 
correlated with skills which we do not measure directly in firm-level data. The lower fixed capital 




                                                 
5 It is not possible to limit the sample to establishments where the total firm size is greater than 50 employees due to 
the way this information is grouped.  However limiting the sample to establishments in firms with over 100 
employees does not change this result.  
6 For an up to date discussion of the relationship between union recognition and firm characteristics see Metcalf 
(2005) 
7 We also explored further the association of unionisation with firm characteristics using union coverage instead of 
union recognition. A lot of the differences come from a contrast between the zero coverage and positive coverage 
firms. For example, value added per worker is 15% lower for firms with 1-9% coverage as compared to those with 
no covered workers. But there is no clear fall of productivity as coverage rises past this point.   7
3.4 Characteristics of Firms with Changing Union Recognition Status 
 
The first six columns of Table 4 compares the characteristics of firms which have 
experienced new recognition with firms which have had no change in recognition status (and 
were non-union initially). The last six columns repeat the exercise for derecognition compared 
with those firms who had no change (and were unionised initially). Our most marked finding in 
Table 2 was the extent of the increase in union recognition since 1997. New recognition is most 
likely among larger firms, firms with lower turnover per employee and firms with lower assets 
per employee. In terms of industrial and regional profile, new recognitions are most likely in 
manufacturing (57% of new recognitions are in this sector compared to 22% of the non-union 
sample). There is also a regional dimension with new recognitions being significantly more 
frequent in the North West, West Midlands, South East and Northern Ireland.  The appearance of 
the South East in this group is particularly noticeable as evidence points towards a persistent 
North –South divide in the extent of unionism (see Table 3 here and Machin, 2004).   
  The results for derecognition in columns (7) through (12) of Table 4 show less striking 
patterns. Of the initially unionised firms it tends to be the smaller ones which experienced 
derecognition, and also those who have lower wages.  Derecognition is more common in London.  
A significantly higher proportion of firms obtaining derecognition (relative to unionised firms 
who do not change status) are in real estate and business services industries; this group of firms 
also had significantly fewer recognitions (compared to firms who remained non-unionised since 
1997). 
We have investigated these results further in a multivariate context so as to explore which 
of the reported correlations are most important. We run probit models of new recognition and 
decrecognition against lagged values of the firm’s employment, wages, productivity, capital 
intensity, two digit industry dummies region, ownership characteristics and an indicator of 
whether the firm is a new firm. The results are reported in Table 5 (recognition in column (1) and 
derecognition in column (2)). The clearest result that emerges relates to firm size.  Larger firms 
are significantly more likely to have experienced new recognitions and significantly less likely to 
have experienced derecognition. There is also a negative association of capital intensity with new 
recognition.  Higher wage firms are significantly less likely to derecognise. 
There are some distinctive industry patterns.  New recognitions are more likely to be 
found in the production section (manufacturing and utilities) and in the Community and Personal 
sector. There is evidence that derecognition is significantly more likely in Public Administration,   8
Education and Health.  It is possible that this result is driven by derecognition in contracted-out 
public services – one reason why the public sector unions may be so hostile to these type of 
reforms. 
There is no distinct regional pattern to new recognition or derecognition in Table 5 - only 
the Northern Ireland dummy is significantly positive for recognition.  In contrast to the earlier 
work stressing cohort effects, there appears to be no significant effect of age on the likelihood of 
recognition, nor any evidence that foreign ownership matters.  
 
3.5 Changes in Recognition and Pre-Existing Levels of Membership in the Firm’s Area and 
Industry 
 
We would expect the statutory recognition procedure to have a strong association with pre-
existing union membership levels. In order for an application for recognition to be accepted by 
Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) at least 10 percent of workers in the proposed bargaining 
unit must be members of the relevant union. Following this, negotiation about the bargaining unit 
occurs. When this is agreed or determined by the CAC, recognition can be granted by the CAC if 
more than half of the agreed bargaining unit are members of the union; otherwise a ballot is held 
in which the union must gain half of the votes and more than 40 percent of the workforce in its 
favour.  
We do not observe pre-existing levels of membership at the firm level (only in 2002), so 
we look at union density in the environment where the firm is operating (i.e. in the same industry 
and in the same region). Empirically, we use data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) to match 
in union membership data to the firm by three digit industry and region cell. The LFS data can be 
used to compute union membership rates in 1997 to 1999, the years immediately prior to the 
introduction of the Employment Relations Act. This variable reflects the chances of a union 
winning a ballot either because higher density in the cell reflects greater union resources for 
fighting a campaign (supply) or because higher density reflects a greater “taste” for unionisation 
in the locality (demand).  Note that the cell-level variable is better than simply the firm’s pre-
existing level of membership. Even if the firm had few union members prior to a recognition 
battle, being in an industry/area with strong unions should still enhance the probability of new 
recognition if the law is effective.
8 
                                                 
8 Of course, if we had both firm-level and cell-level density measures than we would be able to investigate these 
separate channels.   9
Table 6 repeats the first specifications of the multivariate models of recognition and 
derecognition found in Table 5, but adds the aggregated initial union density to the model.  It is 
interesting to consider the impact of density in the firm’s environment on both recognition and 
derecognition. We might expect the effect of local union density to have its strongest effect on 
the recognition decision, but there may also be an impact of the Employment Relations Act on 
derecognition as employers may invest less effort in derecognising unions if they know there is a 
legal procedure that may force them to recognise the union again in the future.  
 In models which do not include one digit industry dummies (column (1) of Table 6) a 10 
percentage point increase in union density in the firm’s region and industry is associated with a 
4.4 percent higher probability of new recognition, and this is strongly significant.  In the 
equivalent model of derecognition, there is a negative, but smaller (in absolute terms), 
relationship between union density and derecognition, with the coefficient on union density being 
-.27 in the derecognition equation compared with .44 in the recognition equation. When one digit 
industry dummies are added to model the significant associations between density and 
recognition changes remain, but there they are very similar in magnitude, with absolute values of 
around .25 to .26.  
Unions therefore appear to be achieving recognition in areas where they are already 
relatively strong as indicated by high existing levels of density (such as manufacturing and the 
utilities). Although they are disproportionately recognised in larger firms, these firms tend to be 
less dynamic (i.e. they are in firms with slower employment growth, lower productivity and less 
investment).  So although the new recognitions have helped “stop the rot” of secular decline, 
these firms may not be the ones that can help unions increase aggregate membership substantially 
(see Figure 1).  We further consider the implications of this in the discussion section below. 
 
3.6 Changes in Firm Characteristics when Union Recognition Status Changes 
 
Finally we look at the association between changes in union status and change in firm 
characteristics. Panel A of Table 7 reports some simple correlations showing that firms who 
recognised unions since 1997 experienced much the same changes compared to those with no 
unions (all the t-statistics in the final column are insignificant at the 5% significance level). This 
is interesting in that new recognition does not seem to have been detrimental to firm performance. 
However, the results for derecognition in Panel B do sometimes indicate a positive 
relationship with changes in firm characteristics.  Derecognising firms tend to have had faster   10
growth in employment, wages and turnover. The evidence suggests that derecognition is more 
strongly associated with good firm performance than are new recognitions. This does not 
necessarily mean that derecognising a union will have a positive causal effect on productivity 
because there may be many unobservable factors that cause firms to improve productivity and 
derecognise unions.  In addition, the survey structure means that we cannot be completely 
confident about how the timing of recognition or derecognition matches up with changes in firm 
characteristics. 
Bryson and Gomez (2003) discuss the implications of “switching costs” in deterring 
individuals’ from changing union membership status. Switching costs could also apply to 
employer-led changes in recognition, implying that the employer benefits of derecognition would 
need to be very large to justify the costs of derecognition (in terms of union resistance and public 
relations).  This may be why there is a positive association of derecognition and sales per worker 




The overall picture that emerges from the new survey is that the post-1997 period has been 
characterised by a ‘blip up’ in new recognitions.  This may well have been related to the change 
in government and the resultant changes in legislation.  But, despite recognition rising, there are 
several features of the new recognition that are worth stressing.  First, they seem to have been 
more prevalent in sectors where a core of membership already existed so that pre-existing 
membership levels were able to facilitate the new recognition.  The new recognitions were 
disproportionately concentrated in manufacturing where most (though not all) sub-sectors are in 
decline.  The second key feature of the new recognition is that it does not seem to have had 
deleterious economic consequences for the firms which have granted new recognition.  Indeed, 
the changes in a range of economic variables were statistically indistinguishable from those in 
firms with no changes in recognition status.  Third, this is not true of the derecognitions that 
occurred.  These do seem to have been associated with improved productivity levels once 
derecognition was triggered (see also Gregg, Machin and Metcalf, 1993, for earlier evidence on 
this). 
Given the extensive literature that finds union impacts on firm performance (wages, 
productivity, profits and employment growth – see Metcalf, 2004, for a survey) our findings may 
at first appear to be a puzzle. One explanation is that unions no longer have much power in the   11
UK, so even when they attain recognition they have little impact on firm behaviour (e.g. Machin, 
2001, finds no significant impact of British union recognition on male wages by the late 1990s 
and Menezes-Filho, 1997, found no significant impact of unions on profits by the 1990s). 
Another explanation, however, is that our results are consistent with evidence in the US that has 
focused on the impact of changes in union status driven by election wins. Freeman and Kleiner 
(1990) conducted a survey of firms which recognised unions through the Boston and Kansas City 
National Labor Relations Board districts in the 1980s.  They only found modest gains in wage 
levels from new recognition, especially when they used a matching approach based on managers’ 
appraisals of their nearest competitors. DiNardo and Lee (2004) compare changes in performance 
in firms who ‘just won’ recognition with those who ‘just lost’ union elections between 1984 and 
1999. They are unable to find statistically significant effects on employer wages, employment, 
output or productivity.   
In summary, U.S. studies that exploit changes in union status to look at unions and firm 
performance have not uncovered large causal effects of unions on firm behaviour. Our study is in 
line with these results. This may be because more recent recognitions in the UK and US since 
1980 have simply conferred less bargaining power to unions. This interpretation is supported by 
Stewart (1995) who found no union wage premium for firms younger than 6 years old in the 1990 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. Alternatively, it may be that the older literature 
comparing simple correlations of the level of union status with the level of firm outcomes is 
misleading because of the plethora of other factors correlated with the level of unionisation. In 
this case the importance of unions for having an impact on economic performance might have 





In this paper we have described a new union survey we administered in 2002. Relative to studies 
of changes in union recognition arrangements undertaken in earlier time periods, we find a higher 
incidence of new recognitions in the periods we study. 11% of surveyed firms newly recognised 
unions between 1997 and 2002, as compared to only 3% between 1985 and 1990. At the same 
time, there was a very similar proportion of derecognitions in both periods (7% in the late 1990s 
compared to 8% in the late 1980s). These recognitions were particularly prevalent among large 
firm and in sectors where membership levels were already relatively high.     12
These new survey findings provide something of a double edged sword for union 
organisers. On the one hand, new recognitions are rising.  On the other hand, they are 
concentrated in places where unions have traditionally been strong and unions are not making 
much headway in getting into the more dynamic firms which are likely to be the leaders of the 
future.  As Gall (2004) puts it “Large scale redundancies in organisations with recognition, the 
concentration of recognition campaigns in areas of traditional strength and the continued growth 
of non-union sectors may suggest that unions in Britain are running very fast to stand still”.  
However, the new survey evidence we have shown may also offer a glimmer of hope. There has 
been an increase in new recognitions, but no parallel increase in derecognition rates, which is 
suggestive that the new union legislation has have been important. This may provide a stepping 
stone to more new recognitions, perhaps even in hard to reach low unionised sectors.  
   13
Table 1: Mean Values of Variables for Respondents and Non-Respondents 
 
 Respondents  Non-respondents  Differences 
 Mean  Number  of 
Firms 
Mean Number  of 
Firms 
Differences 






            
Number of employees  3,098  708  3,949  1,903  -852  1.46 
Sales (£1000s)  428   703  521  1,886  -93  1.19 




64.21 683  69.01  1,845  4.71  0.27 
Sales / employment 
(£1000s) 
468.23 703  508.91    1,886  -40.67  0.35 
Pre-tax profit/ 
employment  
32.96 706  35.75    1,898  -2.79  0.17 
Total assets  
/employment (£1000s) 
164.74 708  168.60    1,901  3.86  0.07 
Employment growth 
1996-1998 
.090 584  .096    1,588  -.006  0.45 
            
Industry            
Agriculture, mining 
and utilities 
.053 706  .035    1,890  .019  2.19 
Manufacturing and 
construction 
.404 706  .390    1,890  .013  0.61 
Services .542  706  .575    1,890  -.032  1.47 
            
At least some 
recognition 
.480 702         
            
 
Notes:  
1.  Employees, turnover, average wage and productivity variables are all derived from FAME data.  
2.  We use data in 1997 unless the firm was born in a later year in which case we use the first year it appeared 
in FAME.  
3.  As data from a variety of years is being used all monetary values are deflated to 2002 prices.  
4.  In all subsequent tables sales, wages, value-added and assets are expressed in £1000s. 
5.  Value-added is defined as pre-tax profit plus remuneration.    14
Table 2: Changes in Trade Union Recognition 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
 1997-2002  1985-1990 
 (Gregg and 
Yates) 
1980-1984 
(Gregg and Yates) 
 








New recognition in some 
workplaces 
8.9 2.9 1.1 
Any new recognition 
 
10.7 3.5  2.2 
No change but unions 
present 
35.3 49.4 57.3 
Derecognition in some 
workplaces 
2.6 6.7 1.8 
Complete derecognition 
throughout the company 
4.6 1.7 1.1 
Any derecognition 
 
7.2 8.4 2.9 
Number of Firms  652  478  436 
 
Notes: 
Cells give percentage of respondents who gave information on recognition changes. Consequently those referring to 
the Gregg and Yates data differ slightly from those given in the original paper.   15
Table 3: Differences in the Firm Characteristics by Recognition Status 
 
 At  least  some 
recognition 
No recognition  Differences  











ln(Employees)   7.20   339  6.08   363  1.12   10.28 
ln(Wage)  3.15   339  3.23   363  -.079   2.00 
ln(value added/employment)   3.44   331  3.58   347  -.141  2.15 
ln(sales/employment)   4.92   338  5.41   359  -.490   6.06 
ln(Pre-tax profits/employment)  2.07   280  2.33   298  .260   2.11 
Pre tax profits/employment  12.81   338  57.74   362  44.93   1.70 
ln(Total assets/employment)   3.36   317  3.63   334  -.274   2.30 
Employment growth 1996-
1998 
.061   283  .120   299  -.057   2.67 
Industry            
Agriculture, mining and 
utilities 
.071   339  .036   361  .035   2.06 
Manufacturing and 
construction 
.563   339  .258   361  .306   8.66 
Services  .366   339  .706   361  -.341   9.60 
Region           
North East  .012  337  .030  363  -.018  1.68 
North West  .116  337  .055  363  .061  2.90 
Yorks and Humber  .080  337  .039  363  .042  2.35 
East Midlands  .053  337  .050  363  .004  0.23 
West Midlands  .125  337  .052  363  .052  3.41 
East .092  337  .072  363  .020  0.98 
London .196  337  .333  363  -.137  4.15 
South East  .136  337  .215  363  -.078  2.72 
South West  .056  337  .063  363  -.007  0.39 
Wales .020  337  .025  363  -.004  0.35 
Scotland .065  337  .055  363  .010  0.56 
Northern Ireland  .047  337  .011  363  .036  2.91 
 
Notes: 
1.  Employees, turnover, average wage and productivity variables are all derived from FAME data.  
2.  We use data in 1997 unless the firm was born in a later year in which case we use the first year it appeared 
in FAME.  
3.  As data from a variety of years is being used all monetary values are deflated to 2002 prices.  
4.  In all subsequent tables sales, wages, value-added and assets are expressed in £1000s. 
5.  Value-added is defined as pre-tax profit plus remuneration.  16 
Table 4: Differences in Firm Characteristics by Recognition Status 





No change and 
non union 
initially 
(3) - (1)  
Some new recognition- 




Some de- recognition 
 
No change and 
union initially 
(9) - (7) 
Some de- recognition 
- 
No change (union 
initially) 





















ln(Employees)  7.11  70  6.14   352  .965   4.90  6.73   47  7.21   230  -.481   2.17 




3.44   67  3.57   336  -.138   1.07  3.34   42  3.41   228  -.071   0.61 
ln(Sales/ 
employment) 












.079   60  .116   290  -.037   1.25  .143   39  .057   190   .085     1.58 
Industry                   
Agriculture 
and Fishing 
0  70  .003 350  .003  0.45  .022  46  .009 230    .013    0.78 
Mining  .029  70  .020 350  .009    0.45  .022  46  .026 230  -.004    0.17 
Manufacturing  .571  70  .223   350  .349   6.17  .413  46  .482  230  -.070   0.86 
Utilities  .029  70  .006   350  .023   1.80  0   46  .043   230  -.043   1.44 




.114    70  .306 350  -.191    3.14  .174  46  .139 230  -.035    0.61 
Hotels and 
catering 
0  70  .009 350  -.009    0.78  .022  46  .017 230    .004    0.20 
Transport .071  70  .060  350  .011    0.36 .043  46  .091  230  -.047    1.07 












.043  70  .017   350  .026   1.36  .022  46  .043  230  -.022   0.67 
 
Notes: 
1.  Employees, turnover, average wage and productivity variables are all derived from FAME data.  
2.  We use data in 1997 unless the firm was born in a later year in which case we use the first year it appeared in FAME.  
3.  As data from a variety of years is being used all monetary values are deflated to 2002 prices.  
4.  In all subsequent tables sales, wages, value-added and assets are expressed in £1000s. 
5.  Value-added is defined as pre-tax profit plus remuneration.  18 
Table 5: Probit Regressions Associating New Recognition and Characteristics 
 
 (1)  (2) 
 Probit  models  of  new 
recognition  
Sample of firms initially 
without unions 
Probit model of  
derecognition  
Sample of firms initially 
with unions 
    
ln (Employment)  .056 (4.26)  -.059 (3.63) 
ln (Wage)  -.027 (0.52)  -.235 (3.03) 
ln (Value added/ employment)  .081 (2.00)  .029 (0.51) 
ln(Total assets/ employment)  -.039 (2.70)  .016 (0.92) 
Industry    
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and 
Mining 
.418 (1.77)  .305 (1.44) 
Manufacturing  .334 (2.51)  .010 (0.13) 
Utilities .580  (1.68)   
Retail, Wholesale and Repairs, 
Hotel and Catering 
.059 (0.56)  -.066 (0.66) 
Transport .168  (1.05)  -.028  (0.34) 
Public Admin, Education and 
Health 
.061 (0.55)  .354 (2.33) 
Finance, Real Estate and Business 
Services 
.191 (1.06)  -.099 (1.22) 
Community and personal services  .602 (2.46)  .305 (1.44) 
Region    
North West  .209 (1.40)  -.120 (1.41) 
Yorkshire and Humberside  -.058 (0.66)  -.063 (0.53) 
East Midlands  .064 (0.52)  -.028 (0.19) 
West Midlands  .235 (1.55)  -.101 (1.01) 
East .077  (0.65)  -.055  (0.45) 
London -.040  (0.47)  -.029  (0.21) 
South East  -.076 (1.00)  -.052 (0.40) 
South West and Wales  -.031 (0.34)  -.121 (1.64) 
Scotland .070  (0.55)  -.135  (1.79) 
Northern Ireland  .444 (2.02)   
    
Foreign Owned  -.027 (0.75)  -.055 (1.17) 
Unconsolidated dummy  .083 (2.09)  -.062 (1.32) 
New firm (since 1996)  -.019 (0.41)  -.014 (0.22) 
    
Sample 377  251 
Log Likelihood  -120.61  -84.24 
 
Notes: 
1.  Marginal effects from probit models are reported.  
2.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  
3.  Reference (omitted) categories are Construction for Industry and North East for Region. 
4.  Compared with Table 4 some categories are combined to avoid prefect prediction (e.g. in column (2) 
manufacturing and utilities are combined and Northern Ireland has been combined with Scotland ) 
 19 
Table 6: Changes in Recognition and Union Membership 
 
Panel A  Probit models of new recognition 
Sample of firms initially without unions 
    
 (1)  (2) 
    
Union density in industry*region 
average 1997-1999 
.440 (4.08)  .263 (2.34) 
1 digit industry dummies  No  Yes 
Sample 377  377 
Log Likelihood  -.129.18  -118.26 
    
Panel B  Probit models of derecognition 
Sample of firms initially with unions 
    
 (1)  (2) 
    
Union density in industry*region 
average 1997-1999 
-.268 (2.04)  -.254 (2.12) 
1 digit industry dummies  No  Yes 
Sample 251  251 
Log Likelihood  -90.96  -82.08 
 
Notes: 
1.  Union density is the mean density by 3-digit industry and 1-digit region, averaged over the years 1997-
1999.  This data was obtained from the Labour Force Survey 3
rd quarter over these years. 
2.  All regressions control for ln(employment), ln(wage), ln(value added/employment), regional dummies 
and dummies denoting foreign owned, unconsolidated and new firm. 
3.  The t-statistic for the union density variable is based on standard errors which take account of the 
clustering between region by 3 digit industry cell.   20 
Table 7: Changes in Firm Characteristics by Recognition Changes 1997-2002 
 
Panel A: New Recognition 
  Some new recognition  No change and  non 
union initially 
Differences (new recognition 
compared with no change and 
non union initially) 
Annualised 
Changes 











ln(Employees)  .095   69  .049   346  -.046   1.20 
ln(Wage)  .013   69  .040   346  -.027   1.42 
ln(Productivity)  -.010   68  .024   338  -.034   0.93 
ln(Sales/ 
employment) 
.003   68  .011   344  -.008   0.31 
ln(Pre-tax profits/ 
employment) 
-.067   62  -.000   316  -.067   0.79 
Pre-tax profits/ 
employment 
-.890   68  -8.05   345  7.16   0.26 
Ln (Sales)  .076   68  .069   344  .007   0.21 
ln(Total assets/ 
employment) 
-.003   66  .059   332  -.062   1.26  
            
Panel B: Derecogniton 
  Some derecognition  No change and non 
union initially 
Differences (derecognition 




Mean Number  of 
firms 
Mean Number  of 
firms 
Difference 






ln(Employees) .041   45  .058    370  .072    1.67 
ln(Wage)  .073   45  .031   370  .049   3.00 
ln(Productivity)  .019   42  .018   364  .004   0.12 
ln(Sales/ 
employment) 
.070   45  .003   367  .064   2.76 
ln(Pre-tax profits/ 
employment) 
-.032   37  -.009    341  .036  0.38 
Pre-tax profits/ 
employment 
-7.65   45  -6.778   368  -11.02   1.47 
Ln (Sales)  .105   45  .066   367  .112   2.92 
ln(Total assets/ 
employment) 
-.012   41  .055   357  -.062   0.61 
 
Note: 
1.  Changes are annualised.   
2.  No data is lost as if data if firm does not exists in 1997 or 2002. We use the annual change in whatever 
years available.  
3.  51% of observations are based on 2002-1997 changes, 33% use 2001-1997.  
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Source: Certification Officer Data, published by Department of Trade and Industry 
 
 

































































Annex 1 Survey Form 
UK Company Performance Survey 
PLEASE ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY 
AND RETURN THIS TO US IN THE PRE-PAID ENVELOPE OR BY FAX 
Q1  How many workplaces does your company have in the UK? 
  
Please write in 
 
 
Q2  In how many of these workplaces does the company recognise trade unions for pay bargaining? 
   All of them   1   
   Most of them   2   
   Some of them   3   
   None of them   4   
 
Q3  Roughly what percentage of all your UK employees, including managers, are members of a trade 
union or independent staff association – whether recognised for pay bargaining or not? 
   None   1  
   1-9%   2   
   10-29%   3   
   30-49%   4  
   50-74%   5  
   75-99%   6  
   100%   7  
 
Q4  Roughly what percentage of your UK employees, including managers, have their pay set through 
collective bargaining? 
   None   1  
   1-9%   2   
   10-29%   3   
   30-49%   4  
   50-74%   5  
   75-99%   6  
   100%   7  
 
Q5  Has your company ceased to recognise unions for pay bargaining in the last 5 years? 
   Yes, we have ceased to recognise unions for pay bargaining in some of our workplaces   1  
   Yes, we have ceased to recognise unions for pay bargaining across the company   2   
   No   3   
 
Q6  Has your company begun to recognise unions for pay bargaining in the last 5 years? 
   Yes, we have started to recognise unions for pay bargaining in some of our workplaces   1  
   Yes, we have started to recognise unions for pay bargaining across the company   2   
   No 
 
 3   
Definitions 
‘Collective bargaining’ is negotiation between union(s) and the employer over pay, whether at workplace, 
company, sectoral or national level.  ‘Company’ is the organisation referred to in the covering letter, consisting of 
one or more workplaces.  To ‘recognise’ a union for pay bargaining is to grant it the right to negotiate over pay on 
behalf of some or all of the employees in the company.  ‘Workplace’ refers to premises on a single site.  ‘Union’ 
includes independent staff association. 24 
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